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CHAPTER 7 
Domestic Relations and Persons 
WILLIAM J. GREENLER, JR. 
§7.1. Minors: Use of father's surname. In Margolis v. Margolis1 
an injunction was sought by a father against his divorced wife to re-
strain her from registering their children in schools under the mother's 
maiden name. The lower court found that the use of the mother's 
name was not in the best interests of the children and granted an in-
junction. On appeal this was upheld and further relief was granted, 
affirmatively ordering that the children be registered as Margolis. 
The Margolis case should be considered with Mark v. Kahn.2 Both 
of these cases indicate that the primary consideration in such cases 
is the best interests of the minor child; this is surely true, and the 
result in both cases seems desirable. Both cases leave unclear, how-
ever, just what are the father's rights, if any. In each case the father 
sued in his own right, rather than on behalf of the minor; and in the 
Mark case the Court specifically indicated that the father had the 
right to bring an action in equity on his own behalf to obtain the re-
lief sought. It would seem that a personal right has been at least 
implicitly recognized as existing in the father, although the extent, 
or at least the enforceability of that right, is almost completely co-
extensive with the best interests of the child. 
§7.2. Enforcement of support: Uniform act. In Kirby v. Kirby,1 
brought under the Uniform Enforcement of Support Act,2 now 
under the jurisdiction of the District Courts, the initiating state was 
New York and the responding state Massachusetts. Some points raised 
by the case were fully resolved and the other issues were at least par-
tially resolved. 
First, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the forwarding by the 
initiating state to the wrong District Court,3 followed by the forward-
ing by that court to the proper District Court in whose jurisdiction the 
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§7.1. 1338 Mass. 416, 155 N.E.2d 177 (1959). 
2333 Mass. 517, 131 N.E.2d 758, 53 A.L.R.2d 908 (1956), discussed in 1956 Ann. 
Surv. Mass. Law §§5.2, 9.7. 
§7.2. 1338 Mass. 263,155 N.E.2d 165 (1959). 
2 G.L., c. 27M. 
3 The Lawrence District Court. 
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respondent lived, followed in turn by process issued from the latter 
court and served in hand upon the respondent, was a compliance with 
Chapter 273A. This is in consonance with the policy. specifically 
declared in that chapter.4 The Supreme Judicial Court went on to 
hold that the forwarding from the wrong to the right court was a com-
pliance with Section 8 of the chapter. Typographical errors and mis-
spellings, as arguments against the validity of the petition, were held 
to be frivolous. 
Second, it appeared that the respondent had appeared specially by 
attorney and moved to quash the process and to dismiss. Both mo-
tions were denied and an order of support was made. The Court held 
that the making of an order against a defendant who had never ap-
peared generally nor answered to the merits, and before he was ever 
defaulted, was error. 
Third, considering questions not necessary to the decision but treated 
because they might arise on retrial, the Court indicated that the pro-
ceedings forwarded by the initiating state were insufficient upon which 
to base an order because the petition failed to disclose the residence 
of the children. The statement of residence of the petitioner was 
held to be insufficient without a further allegation of the residence 
of the children, under both the New York and Massachusetts versions 
of the uniform act. 
The Court rejected a contention regarding the verification of the 
petition, holding that the oath before the clerk of the New York 
Children's Court - similar to many oaths authorized to be adminis-
tered before clerks of Massachusetts courts - was in conformance 
with the provisions of Chapter 273A. 
Perhaps most significant of all, the latter part of the opinion defined 
the force and extent of the petition and the certificate of the initiating 
state. The procedure in the initiating state is ex parte: the findings 
are not evidence,5 and are not analogous to findings in jury-waived 
proceedings. The case cannot be heard without evidence, and the 
transcript of testimony is not a deposition. In the absence of an ap-
pearance by the respondent and admissions by him sufficient to prove 
the case, the case must fail unless proved by deposition or direct testi-
mony of the petitioner. The whole purpose of the law, of course, is 
to prevent the necessity of the latter. 
Finally, the Court reiterated the proposition that now, by statute,6 
the legal duty to support a child continues even though a father is 
deprived of legal custody. 
4 See G.L., c. 273A, §17, stating that the chapter "shall be so construed and 
interpreted as to accomplish its general purpose .... " "The purpose of the Uni-
form Enforcement of Support Act is to obtain support for dependents, and not to 
provide a procedural field day for defaulting. husbands and fathers." Wilkins, C.]., 
in Kirby v. Kirby, 338 Mass. 263, 268,155 N.E.2d 165, 168-169 (1959). 
5 The Court cited Phillips v. Phillips, 336 Mass. 561, 146 N.E.2d 919 (1958). 
6 G.L., c. 273, §8. 
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§7.3. Support of kindred. In Town of Hatfield v. Klimoski,l the 
defendant claimed the right to appeal to the Superior Court under 
the provisions of G.L., c. 231, §97. This was a proceeding in the Dis-
trict Court to enforce the liability of kindred to support a parent under 
G.L., c. 117. The Supreme Judicial Court held that this proceeding, 
with all its changes through recent years from Superior Court to Pro-
bate Court and now to District Court,2 remains essentially an equity 
proceeding, and as such it is not subject to appeal to the Superior 
Court under Section 97. 
§7.4. Adoption. The case of Adoption of a Minor1 was one of first 
impression regarding the requirement of consent of the natural father 
of an illegitimate child who, after the mother's consent had been given 
to the adoption, married her, thereby legitimizing the child.2 In this 
case the child was placed with the petitioners through the mother's 
doctor with the active cooperation of the natural father. The Depart-
ment of Public Welfare filed a report disapproving the proposed 
adoption.s Both natural parents now oppose the adoption, and had 
in the meantime married each other. 
The withdrawal of the mother's consent was, of course, within the 
discretion of the court.4 The main question was whether the father's' 
consent, never having been formally given and the child now being 
legitimate, was necessary. If necessary at all, it would be absolutely 
necessary rather than a discretionary matter. Ii 
The Supreme Judicial Court examined the authorities and cited 
many conflicting cases in its opinion. The Court finally concluded 
that the consent of a father who was not a lawful parent at the time 
of the child's birth, nor at the time there is a default under the adop-
tion procedure,6 is not required by Section 2 of G.L., c. 210. Unfor-
tunately, the Court beclouds this conclusion by mentioning a possible 
estoppel by the father's participation in the placement, although it 
goes on to say this "probably does not impose an absolute estoppel" 
upon him "for the probate judge could certainly permit him to oppose 
[the adoption]." In view of the ultimate conclusion that his consent 
is not required, it would seem that this latter had better been left 
unsaid, for if Section 2 requires his consent the Probate Court could 
have no discretion in the matter. The case adds up, it seems, to a flat 
ruling that the father's consent is not required in such a situation. 
There are other points in the present case, probably of lesser im-
§7.3. 1338 Mass. 81, 153 N.E.2d 648 (1958). 
2 Acts of 1950, c. 485, as amended by Acts of 1956, c. 156. 
§7.4. 1338 Mass. 635, 156 N.E.2d 801 (1959). 
2 G.L., c. 190, §7. 
SId., c. 210, §5A. 
4 This is settled by Erickson v. Raspperry, 320 Mass. 333, 69 N.E.2d 479 (1946). 
See Wyness v. CroWley, 292 Mass. 461, 198 N.E.2d 758 (1935). 
Ii GL., c. 210, §2. 
6Id. §§4, 5. 
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portance but nevertheless worthy of comment. First, the Court noted 
that the Department had not approved the adoption, but held that 
the Probate Court properly treated the hearing on the merits as an 
appeal from the disapproval under G.L., c. 210, §2A(E), no formal 
document of appeal being necessary. ' 
More important, the Supreme Judicial Court commented upon the 
circumstances of the child's placement. The facts were that the un-
married prospective mother asked the doctor to refer the baby to some 
private family. The doctor found that the petitioners were childless 
and were going to Sicily to find a child to adopt; he informed them, 
while already in Europe, that this child was available, and they re-
turned immediately; the mother and natural father soon thereafter 
left the child at the doctor's office. This was recited as the evidence, 
although the probate judge found that the child was left with the 
male petitioner's brother. The Court said that it was immaterial 
whether the parents left the child with the petitioner's brother or with 
the doctor, "for the judge would have been amply justified in finding 
that the doctor was the mother's agent." There was a finding that 
the "adoption paper" was signed in a manner so that the petitioners 
would not know the names of the adopting parents. It is difficult to 
conceive of a case wherein a doctor had greater power over the adop-
tion than that here authorized by the mother; the only possible exer-
cise of greater power by a doctor might occur if he placed a child 
entirely on his own without previous consultation with the mother. 
Hence, the question arises, when is any placement by a doctor illegal? 
General Laws, c. 119, §6, cited in a footnote to the opinion,7 seems 
obviously intended to impose strict regulations upon just such place-
ments as this. 
§7.5. Foreign decrees: Enforcement. In Adams v. Adams,1 a suit 
was brought in the Superior Court upon a New York judgment for 
an arrearage under a New York separate support decree. After the 
decree in New York, and before the New York judgment now sued 
upon, the husband obtained a decree of divorce in Illinois. The wife 
argued that the Illinois divorce was not valid because she never ap-
peared in that proceeding and never was personally served with proc-
ess. The trial judge found that the action could not be maintained 
because the plaintiff wife had taken the position that she was still the 
wife, and therefore could not sue her husband in the Superior Court 
under the provisions of G.L., c. 209, §6. The Supreme Judicial Court 
upheld the ruling that if she were still the wife she could not sue in 
the Superior Court but overruled the trial judge's ruling that she had 
taken an irrevocable position that she was still the wife. The judge 
had found it unnecessary to rule upon the validity of the Illinois di-
vorce. This was held error. The Court noted that the rule of New 
York regarding "divisible divorce" applied, namely that the severance 
7 1I118 Mass. 6115, 6118, 156 N.E.2d SOl, 801I-804 (1959). 
57.5. 1 1I11S Mass. 776, 157 N.E.2d 405 (1959). 
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of the marital bond by a foreign divorce does not necessarily cut off 
the effect of a New York decree for separate support.! 
The Court reasoned that if, under the rule of the Estin case,s the 
duty of support under the New York decree might still remain, al-
though the parties might be divorced and therefore no longer husband 
and wife, this action might be maintained in the Superior Court. The 
case was therefore remanded for determination of the validity of the 
Illinois divorce. 
§7.6. Marriage: Validity. The latest in the line of cases ruling on 
validation of a bigamous marriage by living together in good faith 
after removal of the impedimentl is Stamper v. Stanwood.2 This case 
involved the right of one alleged cousin to have notice of and to be 
heard on the petition for appointment of an administrator of an estate. 
The question was whether the grandparents of the party were legally 
married. The marriage, in 1854, was admittedly bigamous because 
the male party had been married in 1850 and there was no evidence 
as to the whereabouts of the first wife. However, the second wife lived 
with him for over forty-five years and they had ten children, including 
the mother of the party now litigant. There seemed to be no evidence 
that the second wife knew of the previous marriage at the time of her 
marriage in 1854, but there was evidence that she did know of the 
previous marriage at least in 1880. The Supreme Judicial Court held 
that the wife was entitled to rely upon the seven-year presumption of 
death of the former wife, and that "every presumption is in favor of 
her good faith." S The validity of the marriage was upheld and the 
descendant held entitled to notice and to be heard in the administra-
tion proceedings. 
2 Estin v. Estin, 296 N.Y. 808, 78 N.E.2d 1111 (1947), aU'd, 884 U.S. 541, 68 Sup. 
Ct. 1213.92 L. Ed. 1561 (1948). 
3 See note 2 supra. 
§7.6. 1 GL., c. 207, §6. 
21959 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1169, 159 N.E.2d 865. 
31959 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1172. 159 N.E.2d at 868. Compare Fraser v. Fraser, lIS6 
Mass. 597, 147 N.E.2d 165 (1958). 
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